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Abstract
We examine whether tax audits become more efficient if tax auditors have access to
audited financial statements and information about statutory audit adjustments. We
extend the standard tax compliance game by a statutory auditor to analyze the strategic
interactions among a firm issuing financial and tax reports, a statutory auditor, and a
tax auditor. For medium-powered tax auditor incentives and firms that place a high
weight on book income, we show that granting the tax auditor access to information
on statutory audit adjustments increases firms’ tax compliance, raises tax revenues,
and decreases tax audit frequency. Thus more information sharing between statutory
and tax auditors could be an important but so far overlooked policy instrument to
combat tax evasion and increase tax audit efficiency. However, we also highlight the
limitations of this approach. The efficiency effect of information sharing turns out
to be ambiguous in many constellations and depends on the strength of tax auditor
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1 Introduction
In many countries, tax administration budgets have declined significantly in recent
years, and tax administrations, therefore, reduced their workforce. For example, the
United States Internal Revenue Service reduced the number of its employees from
94,711 in 2010 to 73,518 in 2018 (IRS, 2019). Similarly, the number of employees at
the U.K. tax authority, the HMRC, fell from 91,167 in 2005 to 61,370 in 2014 (Slem-
rod, 2016). This raises the importance of improving the tax audit selection process
to increase tax revenues per tax audit costs, i.e., tax audit efficiency. Using a game-
theoretical model, this paper investigates whether giving tax auditors access to audited
financial statements and information about statutory audit adjustments increase the ef-
ficiency of the tax audit regime.
The idea of this paper is based on the observation that financial statements are often
subject to two kinds of audit: a statutory audit that is conducted by an independent pri-
vate auditor and, usually with a time lag, a tax audit that is conducted by the country’s
tax administration. This observation raises the question of whether information shar-
ing between statutory and tax auditors could be used to increase tax audit efficiency,
i.e., to simultaneously increase tax revenues and reduce tax audit frequency.
In general, values from financial accounting are positively correlated with values in
tax accounting, meaning that financial accounting information could provide an in-
formative signal for tax auditors (Mills and Sansing, 2000). However, at first sight,
it might be surprising why providing access to statutory audit adjustments could pro-
vide an additional informative signal for tax auditors because these adjustments do not
contain any direct information regarding tax values. The statutory audits of financial
accounting statements are conducted by independent private auditors, certified pub-
lic accountants. Moreover, statutory auditors are typically perceived as conservative,
i.e., they are primarily interested in preventing upward earnings management but not
in preventing downward earnings management, which is what firms might do to save
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taxes. The statutory audit adjustments, however, reveal information on whether a firm
has engaged in upward earnings management of book income. As we will show in
this paper, the strategic incentives to conduct upward earnings management of book
income depend to some extent on a firm’s taxable income. Thus the information about
statutory audit adjustments provides an additional informative signal to the tax auditor
with respect to the correct tax treatment.
Tax administrations seem to have recognized the potential benefits of financial state-
ments and statutory audit information for tax audits. Firms in many countries are
obliged to file their financial accounting statements together with their tax returns, e.g.,
in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and in some countries, firms must also
file their statutory audit report with the tax administration, e.g., in Belgium, Germany,
and the United Kingdom (see Table 5, appendix B). To the best of our knowledge,
however, the filed statutory audit reports do not currently contain any detailed infor-
mation on the audit adjustments made by the statutory auditor. Therefore, our analysis
goes one step further: We inform legislators as to whether it would be efficient to also
provide the tax auditors with information on documented adjustments made by the
statutory auditor. Thus we contribute to the ongoing discussion of how to improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of tax administrations (OECD, 2017).
Despite its potential to increase tax compliance, the usage of information from finan-
cial accounting statements and statutory audit adjustments might also trigger opposing
effects. Some firms may attempt to decrease detection risk and manipulate or avoid
the signal, for example, by understating not only taxable income but also financial ac-
counting income such that no book-tax-difference arises (conforming tax avoidance).
Other firms may have a further increased incentive to misreport only taxable income
(non-conforming tax avoidance) to align book and tax income. The overall effect of
using financial accounting information and statutory audit adjustments in the tax audit
selection process is therefore unclear. The aim of our study is to show under which
circumstances information about the statutory audit and financial statements increases
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tax audit efficiency.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. In a first step, we assume that no information
beyond the reported tax return is available. This is the standard inspection game be-
tween taxpayers and tax auditors (Graetz et al., 1986), which we label the reduced-
information regime. Firms (the taxpayers) face an asset valuation issue1 and decide
whether to report the correct tax value or evade taxes. Tax auditors decide, based on
the reported tax returns, whether to conduct a tax audit.
In a second step, we add observable financial accounting statements. In this intermediate-
information regime, firms need to prepare a report not only for tax but also for financial
accounting purposes. For the sake of simplicity, the asset’s tax value can be either low
or high; similarly, the asset’s book value can be either low or high. To reflect existing
similarities between financial accounting principles and tax law, we assume a positive
correlation between book and tax values (Mills and Sansing, 2000). Thus, book values
provide a (noisy) signal regarding a firm’s correct tax value. We assume that firms
have a preference for high book income and low tax income. Accordingly, firms will
have an incentive to engage in upward (downward) management of book (tax) income.
As with tax returns, financial statements are usually subject to an audit. Thus statutory
auditors determine, based on the reported book value, their effort in the statutory audit
of the firm’s asset valuation. In line with prior research, we assume a conservative
statutory auditor who prefers conservative (income-decreasing) accounting choices to
reduce his or her litigation and reputation risk (e.g., Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Kim
et al., 2003; Cahan and Zhang, 2006). Thus the statutory auditor challenges firms’ up-
ward, but not downward, book income management. In the subsequent tax audit, the
tax auditor observes the financial statements in the form in which they were prepared
after the statutory audit. Therefore, the tax auditor has access to financial statement
information but no information about statutory audit adjustments.
1Alternatively, we could assume that the taxpayer makes an expenditure and must decide whether
this expenditure may be expensed or must be capitalized for book and tax income purposes. See Mills
and Sansing (2000).
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In a third step, we model a high-information regime by assuming that the tax auditor
has access to audited financial statements and, in addition, information on required
statutory audit adjustments.
Firms and both auditors alter their reporting and audit decisions with variations in
the information regime. In each information regime, we determine the mixed-strategy
equilibria, where the two auditors employ a probabilistic audit strategy and certain
taxpayers randomize their reporting behavior.2 In these equilibria, we compare the
effects of the different information regimes on our measures of tax audit efficiency:
firms’ tax evasion, tax revenues and tax audit frequency. Our findings reveal that the
effect of information on tax audit efficiency depends on the tax auditors’ incentives
and the importance that firms ascribe to book income.
For countries where tax auditors have medium-powered incentives and firms place a
relatively high weight on book income, our analysis shows an unambiguously positive
effect of information sharing between statutory and tax auditors on tax audit efficiency.
In this case, the additional information can induce higher tax revenues and a lower tax
audit frequency. Information about statutory audit adjustments is particularly useful
under these circumstances, as it allows the tax auditor to decrease the audit probability
to zero for specific reports without any negative effect on tax compliance. Thus shar-
ing information between statutory and tax auditors has the potential to significantly
increase tax audit efficiency.
However, in line with prior research (Sansing, 1993) our results also demonstrate that
giving more information to tax auditors is not always helpful to enhance tax com-
pliance. In particular, we show that information sharing between the auditors is not
effective for all firms. If tax auditors have medium-powered incentives, but firms place
a much higher weight on tax than on book income, tax revenues decrease with in-
formation sharing. Because the tax audit frequency also decreases with information
2We do not examine pure-strategy equilibria in which the tax auditor never or always audits and the
taxpayer always or never evades taxes because these equilibria are rarely observed in real-world audit
and reporting behavior.
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sharing, the overall efficiency effect is ambiguous in this case.
The reason for the different effects of information about statutory audit adjustments is
as follows: In case of a relatively high weight on book income, taxpayers who con-
duct upward earnings management of book income report their tax income truthfully
because this reduces the risk that the statutory auditor corrects earnings management.
Thus, information on detected earnings management signals tax honesty and the tax
auditor can reduce the audit probability for these reports without losing tax revenues.
By contrast, in case of a relatively low weight on book income, the reduced tax audit
probability for reports with detected earnings management comes at the cost of lost
tax revenues. In this case, taxpayers combine upward earnings management with tax
evasion because the benefit of the lower tax audit probability for reports with detected
upward earnings management outweighs the disadvantage that the statutory auditor
potentially corrects earnings management.
In countries where tax auditors have high-powered incentives, our model predicts that
tax auditors do not decrease their audit frequency due to the additional information.
Increasing the information level of the tax auditors induces some firms to engage in
more tax evasion, while other firms reduce their evasion. However, in equilibrium,
average tax evasion remains at the same level. Thus the provision of the additional
information does not affect tax audit efficiency. In countries with low-powered tax
auditor incentives, we find that tax revenues increase if tax auditors have access to
financial statements and statutory auditor reports. However, this comes at the cost of
increased tax audit frequency. Thus the overall efficiency effect is ambiguous in this
case.
Most previous tax compliance research explains tax evasion as taxpayers maximizing
their expected utility given the detection probability and the size of the penalty (Alling-
ham and Sandmo, 1972). However, this fails to recognize that the detection probability
is the result of a game between taxpayers and the government and thus endogenous.
Graetz et al. (1986) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986) were the first to study tax com-
5
pliance as a game in which the revenue agency could not credibly commit to an audit
strategy. Reinganum and Wilde (1988) introduce taxpayer uncertainty regarding the
government’s audit costs, and Beck and Jung (1989) consider tax liability uncertainty.
In Beck et al. (1996), taxpayers are allowed to purchase tax advice to resolve all un-
certainty. Erard and Feinstein (1994) modify the approach of Reinganum and Wilde
(1986) to consider nonstrategic taxpayers. Rhoades (1999) analyzes the impact of
component reporting on the tax compliance game. Bayer (2006) considers taxpayers’
concealment costs and demonstrates that higher tax rates lead to higher tax evasion
and higher concealment and audit costs. Other studies analyze the effect of a signal re-
garding the taxpayer’s income on the audit process. Sansing (1993) examines a signal
regarding the correct tax treatment of a loss. He demonstrates that this signal can result
in an increased amount of tax evasion while tax revenues (before audit costs) remain
unaffected. Beck et al. (2000) study the effect of voluntary disclosures regarding an
uncertain tax benefit to avoid a substantial underpayment penalty if the tax return is au-
dited. Related to the study of Beck et al. (2000), De Simone et al. (2013) investigate the
benefits of “Enhanced Relationship Tax Compliance Programs”. Niggemann (2018)
finds that book-tax conformity restricts misreporting positive book-tax differences but
may impair the accuracy of financial statements.
The two studies most related to our paper are Mills and Sansing (2000) and Mills et al.
(2010). In Mills and Sansing (2000), the tax auditor observes the (correct) financial
statement valuation, which results in a higher audit probability for positive book-tax
differences. Mills et al. (2010) investigate the effects of disclosed uncertain tax posi-
tions according to FIN 48. Contradicting public opinion, they demonstrate that some
taxpayers will actually benefit from mandatory disclosure requirements. Empirical re-
search has confirmed that public financial accounting information can be useful for
tax auditors to infer the tax aggressiveness of companies (e.g. Lisowsky et al. (2013),
Bozanic et al. (2017)).
We contribute to this research by adding the interaction between strategic statutory
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auditors and tax auditors while allowing taxpayers to misreport both financial and tax
reporting positions. The strategic interaction between statutory auditors, tax auditors,
and taxpayers reveals that information sharing between statutory and tax auditors has
the potential to increase tax audit efficiency. In times of decreasing resources for many
tax administrations (Nessa et al., 2019), this is an important policy result. However,
our model also shows that firms and auditors respond to the changing information en-
vironments and that the desired positive effects may depend on the specific countries’
institutional environments that determine, for example, the incentives of statutory and
tax auditors. Thus the optimal tax policy will vary across countries, which might ex-
plain the large empirical variation that we observe in the obligations to file financial
statements and statutory audit reports with the tax administration (Table 5, appendix
B).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the second section, we present
the model. In the third section, we discuss some important aspects of the equilibrium
analysis of the game and introduce our efficiency measures. Sections 4, 5 and 6 in-
vestigate how the three different information environments affect the efficiency of the
tax audit regime. The last section discusses the results and implications for future
research.
2 The model
We consider a multi-stage game involving three players: the manager of a firm, a
statutory auditor, and a tax auditor. The manager has to release a report about both
the tax and the financial statement valuation of an issue.3 Subsequently, the statutory
auditor determines her audit effort and the tax auditor has to decide whether to audit
3To avoid having an excessively complex model, we exclude agency conflicts from the analysis. The
effect of agency problems (among shareholders or between shareholders and managers) on corporate
tax avoidance is analyzed, for example, in Chen and Chu (2005), Crocker and Slemrod (2005), and
Jacob et al. (2019).
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the tax report. All players are assumed to be risk neutral. A definition of all variables
is presented in appendix A.
In the first stage of the game, the firm’s manager (in the following denoted as the “tax-
payer”) faces an asset valuation issue. The asset’s correct book value in the financial
statements is b ∈ {b,b}. A similar valuation issue – with a potentially different out-
come – arises for tax purposes, where the proper valuation is t ∈ {t, t}. We define
∆b = b− b and ∆t = t− t and assume b = t and b = t. Thus, ∆b = ∆t = ∆. Without
loss of generality, we normalize ∆ = 1. Think of different depreciation, amortization
or impairment rules, different rules concerning the capitalization of assets or fair value
vs. historical costs valuation as examples for possibly different book and tax valua-
tions. For both financial statement and tax issues, a low (high) valuation also implies
a low (high) income. Therefore, we use the terms book (tax) valuation and book (tax)
income interchangeably.
We refer to the true valuations (b, t) as the taxpayer’s type. Accordingly, in the game,
the taxpayer can be any of the following four types:
{
(b, t) ,
(
b, t
)
,(b, t) ,
(
b, t
)}
. At
the beginning of the game, nature chooses a type for the taxpayer. Nature’s move is
observed only by the taxpayer such that the correct valuations (b, t) are the taxpayer’s
private information.4 We assume the following common prior probability distribution
over the taxpayer’s type:
1. The ex ante probabilities Prob{t} and Prob{t} are 0.5.
2. The conditional probabilities Prob{b|t} are given by Prob{b|t}= Prob{b|t}= p
and Prob{b|t}= Prob{b|t}= 1− p. We assume that 0.5 < p < 1.
The joint probabilities are Prob{b, t} = 0.5(1− p), Prob{b, t} = 0.5p, Prob{b, t} =
0.5p and Prob{b, t}= 0.5(1− p). Furthermore, Prob{b}= Prob{b}= 0.5.
4We do not address taxpayer’s uncertainty about the correct valuations in this paper. An analysis of
tax uncertainty can be found, for example, in Graetz et al. (1986), Beck and Jung (1989), Beck et al.
(1996), Mills et al. (2010), or De Simone et al. (2013).
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The parameter p is a measure of the conformity between tax and financial statement
valuation. A strong conformity means p→ 1, and a low conformity implies p→ 0.5.
In this sense, the assumption that p > 0.5 ensures that the correlation between tax and
financial statement valuation is positive.
At the beginning of the game, after observing the true values b and t, the taxpayer
decides the valuations bˆ and tˆ to be reported. We assume that the taxpayer makes
simultaneous reports of book and tax income whereas in practice there is usually a
time gap between the filing of annual statements and tax returns. Our simplifying
assumption of simultaneous reports is based on the fact that taxpayers have to calculate
the tax liability when preparing the annual accounts because otherwise they wouldn’t
be able to report the correct amount of deferred taxes. The taxpayer may bias the
reported valuation for example because she is interested in a low asset value for tax
assessment; we specify the taxpayer’s objective function after we have introduced the
other players of the game.
In the second stage of the game the statutory auditor conducts the annual financial
statement audit after having observed the taxpayer’s reported valuations
(
bˆ, tˆ
)
. The
statutory auditor determines the audit effort that can be either high (aS = 1) or low
(aS = 0). The costs of the statutory audit are given by CS (aS = 1) = CS > 0 and
CS (aS = 0) = 0. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a perfect audit technology
for the statutory auditor with regard to the financial statement valuation. That means
that for aS = 1, the statutory auditor with certainty detects an inaccurate financial
statement valuation by the taxpayer. For aS = 0 the statutory auditor will not de-
tect any misreporting. The statutory auditor’s benefits come from reducing litiga-
tion and reputation risk. She benefits from detecting an overstatement of the asset
value
(
bˆ = b although b = b
)
but accepts conservative (income-decreasing) account-
ing choices because they have no impact on litigation and reputation risk. We assume
that the benefit is proportional to the overstatement, λ
(
b−b). Thus, the preferences
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bˆ = b bˆ = b
Type b b′(1) = b b′(1) = b
Type b b′(1) = b b′(1) = b
Table 1: Financial statement valuation b′(aS = 1) after financial statement audit
of the statutory auditor can be characterized by
max
aS∈{0,1}
E
(
λ max
{
bˆ−b′ (aS) ,0
}−CS (aS))
where b′ (aS) is the final financial statement valuation after the statutory auditor’s de-
cision aS, with b′ (0) = bˆ and b′ (1) as in table 1.
We need to assume that λ −CS > 0 to ensure that high effort can be induced as equi-
librium behavior. The statutory auditor’s audit effort decision aS is not observable to
the tax auditor who enters the game at its final stage.
The tax auditor is modeled in a very similar fashion to the statutory auditor. She also
possesses a perfect audit technology with regard to tˆ and has to decide whether to audit
(aT = 1) the tax valuation tˆ or not (aT = 0). The tax auditor benefits from detecting
an understated tax valuation (tˆ = t although t = t) but earns no benefit from detecting
an overstatement.5 Denoting the tax auditor’s preference parameter for detecting an
understatement by δ and the personal cost of auditing actions aT by CT (aT ), the tax
auditor’s objective function can be written as
max
aT∈{0,1}
E(δ max{t ′(aT )− tˆ, 0}−CT (aT )). (1)
Here t ′ (aT ) denotes the final tax valuation after the tax auditor’s decision aT , with
t ′(0) = tˆ, t ′(1) = t. We further assume CT (0) = 0 and CT (1) =CT > 0.
Similar to the statutory auditor we impose the regularity condition δ −CT > 0. Figure
5There are typically implicit incentives for assessing additional taxes during tax audits because the
effectiveness of the tax audit staff is evaluated with respect to additional taxes ‘earned’ from tax audits
(Alissa et al., 2014). In some countries, explicit incentives also exist (Kahn et al., 2001).
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1 summarizes the timing of events in our model.
taxpayer privately
observes her type
(b, t)
taxpayer releases
reports (b̂, t̂)
audit effort
decision by
statutory auditor
audit decision
by tax auditor
Figure 1: Timeline of events
We are now able to specify the taxpayer’s objective function. Assuming that the tax-
payer is interested in a low asset value for tax assessment and in a high asset value in
the financial statements, a taxpayer of type (b, t) maximizes the following function
max
bˆ,tˆ
E(ω ·b′(aS)− γ · t ′(aT )−FT (t ′(aT ))−FB(b′(aS))), (2)
FT and FB denote disutility from penalties due when an incorrect valuation is detected
either in the tax (FT ) or in the financial statements (FB), respectively. They are defined
by
FT (t ′) =
FT , if t
′ 6= tˆ
0, else
and FB(b′) =
FB, if b
′ 6= bˆ
0, else.
(3)
The parameters ω and γ are positive weights indicating the taxpayer’s preferences
for financial statement and tax valuation. In the following, we consider the case of
γ > ω , implying that the taxpayer’s preferences are more sensitive to the tax than
to the financial statement valuation. This is typical for firms characterized by low
capital market exposure, by managers not predominantly driven by financial reporting
measures and by less important outside debt financing. Thus, taxpayers with γ >ω can
be regarded as managers of mainly private firms. Our focus on firms that give at least a
small prioritization of tax outcomes over book outcomes is based on the fact that only
these firms have an incentive to conduct conforming tax avoidance. However, we will
discuss the implications for firms that prioritize book over tax outcomes in section 7.
Analyzing the effect of different information environments on tax compliance, we con-
11
Regime 1
(reduced
information)
Regime 2
(intermediate
information)
Regime 3
(high information)
Taxpayer
observes
• true values b, t
Tax Auditor
observes
• report t̂ • report t̂• final valuation b′
• report t̂
• final valuation b′
• correction of b̂ to b′
Statutory Auditor
observes
• not present • report b̂• report t̂
• report b̂
• report t̂
Table 2: Different informational structures considered in the game.
sider three different regimes. Across the regimes, we vary the information available to
the tax auditor when he or she has to select an audit strategy, see table 2.
We begin with a benchmark setting (reduced-information regime) in which neither
financial statements nor statutory auditor are present. The game is only between the
taxpayer and the tax auditor, who observes the tax report. Thus our benchmark is
a standard tax compliance inspection game (Graetz et al., 1986). The second regime
(the intermediate-information regime) simultaneously introduces the need for financial
statement valuation and the statutory auditor. We assume that the statutory auditor
observes both the report on financial statements bˆ and that on tax valuation tˆ. The
tax auditor, in contrast, observes the report on tax valuation tˆ and the final financial
statement valuation b′ after the statutory auditor’s effort choice. In regime 3 (the high-
information regime), both auditors observe the same information as in regime 2, but the
tax auditor can also observe whether the statutory auditor has corrected the taxpayer’s
financial statement valuation. Formally, this is equivalent to a setting where the tax
auditor observes the tax report tˆ, the final valuation b′ and the financial statement
report bˆ.
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3 Preliminary analysis
The game described in the previous section is an inspection game with two auditors.
Inspection games only have pure-strategy equilibria for extremely low or high inspec-
tion costs. Thus the inspectors never or always audit, and the inspectee always or
never reports falsely. We do not consider these equilibria because they are rarely de-
scriptive of real-world audit and reporting behavior. Therefore, we concentrate on
mixed-strategy equilibria, in which the two auditors employ a probabilistic audit strat-
egy and some taxpayer types randomize their reporting behavior. In these equilibria,
we compare the effects of the different information regimes on the efficiency measures
of tax evasion, tax revenue and tax audit frequency. This section (1) describes the equi-
librium in the reduced information setting, (2) eliminates dominated strategies in the
intermediate- and high-information regimes, and (3) defines the efficiency measures
tax evasion, lost tax revenue and tax audit frequency.
3.1 Equilibrium in the reduced-information regime
As a first step, we compute the equilibrium in the reduced information setting. In this
case, the game reduces to a simple variant of the inspection game. Thus proposition 1
replicates equilibrium strategies well known in the literature.
Proposition 1 (Reduced information regime) If there is no financial statement val-
uation, the equilibrium strategies of the taxpayer and tax auditor are as follows:
• Taxpayer: Type t reports truthfully. Type t reports t with probability θT := CTδ−CT
as long as θT ≤ 1. Type t always reports t for θT > 1.
• Tax auditor: Report t is never verified. Report t is verified with probability
α = γγ+FT for θT ≤ 1 and never for θT > 1.
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Proof: See appendix D.1 
The term θT = CTδ−CT can be interpreted as a reverse measure of the tax auditor’s in-
centives. Low values of θT represent low audit costs and high rewards for detecting
underreporting, implying high-powered incentives. A combination of high audit costs
and low rewards yields low-powered incentives for the tax auditor and a large θT .
Proposition 1 states that the taxpayer’s misreporting probability decreases with the
tax auditor’s incentives. By choosing a misreporting probability amounting to θT , the
taxpayers ensure that the tax auditor is indifferent between auditing and not auditing
a report tˆ = t, and by choosing the tax audit probability α , the tax auditor makes the
taxpayers indifferent between tax evasion and honest tax reporting. The unique mixed-
strategy equilibrium vanishes if incentives become very low. In this case, the taxpayer
always misreports, and the tax auditor never challenges the reported tax valuation.
3.2 Dominated strategies in regimes 2 and 3 and notation
We proceed with the intermediate- and the high-information regime. In these cases,
financial statements and the statutory auditor enter the scene and things become more
complicated. To simplify the following analysis, it is useful to rule out actions that will
never be part of any equilibrium because they are dominated by other actions.
Lemma 1 In regimes 2 and 3, the following actions will never be played in equilib-
rium:
• The tax auditor will never audit a tax report t.
• The statutory auditor will never audit a financial statement report b with high
effort.
• A taxpayer of type b, t will always report truthfully.
• A taxpayer of type b, t will never report b, t.
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• A taxpayer of type b, t will never report b, t and b, t.
Proof: See appendix D.2. 
Intuitively, the tax and statutory auditors will never audit reports that do not offer
them any potential benefits. The taxpayer will never issue reports that imply a lower
payoff, even absent any detection risk, than the payoff under truthful reporting. Table
3 displays the reporting strategies for the taxpayer reports that are not dominated (see
lemma 1 above).
Type b, t b, t b, t b, t
Report b, t b, t b, t b, t b, t b, t b, t b, t b, t b, t
Table 3: The taxpayer’s non dominated reporting strategies
Table 4 contains the definitions of the tax and statutory auditor’s audit probabilities.
The tax auditor’s audit probabilities depend on whether we consider regime 2 or regime
3. While in regime 2 the tax auditor can only observe the final financial statement
valuation in addition to the tax report, in regime 3 the tax auditor can make the audit
probabilities also conditional on the (possible) correction by the statutory auditor.
x1 Statutory auditor audits report b with high effort given tax report t
x2 Statutory auditor audits report b with high effort given tax report t
α Tax auditor audits t given report b, t (regimes 2 and 3)
β Tax auditor audits t given report b, t (regime 2)
β1 Tax auditor audits t given uncorrected report b, t (regime 3)
β2 Tax auditor audits t given corrected report b, t (regime 3)
Table 4: Audit probabilities for the tax and statutory auditors in regimes 2 and 3
In the following, we use superscripts "R1", "R2" and "R3" to identify the three different
regimes. For example, αR2 denotes the tax audit probability for report b, t in regime 2.
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3.3 Efficiency measures
The tax evasion probability (TE) is generally defined as the unconditional probability
of a low tax valuation report by the high-tax-valuation types, i.e.,
TE = prob{tˆ = t, t}= 1
2
(p ·prob{tˆ = t|b, t}+(1− p) ·prob{tˆ = t|b, t}). (4)
The following lemma shows that different information regimes do not necessarily im-
ply a different tax evasion probability.
Lemma 2 (Constant tax evasion property) 1. Suppose that an equilibrium is char-
acterized by αR1 > 0 in the reduced-information regime 1, αR2,βR2 > 0 in the
intermediate-information regime 2 and αR3,βR31 ,β
R3
2 > 0 in the high-information
regime 3. This implies that TE = 12θT independent of the information regime.
2. Suppose that one of the audit probabilities in regime 1, 2 or 3 is equal to zero.
Then, TE < 12θT .
Proof: See appendix D.3. 
Lemma 2 states that additional information does not affect tax evasion if all reports
are subject to a positive tax audit probability. The reason for this result is that in
equilibrium the tax auditor is indifferent between auditing and not auditing the report.
Indifference on the part of the tax auditor, however, requires that the ratio of false to
correct reports is identical for each type of report and set such that the tax auditor
expects on average “no profit”. Therefore, as long as each report with low tax values is
audited by the tax auditor with a positive probability, firms’ average tax evasion must
remain the same in all information regimes.
In addition to tax evasion, we analyze two other measures that characterize the tax
audit efficiency. These measures are defined as follows:
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1. Frequency of tax audits: The audit frequency can be measured by the ex ante
probability of a tax audit. In the reduced-information regime, the tax audit fre-
quency can simply be written as
TAR1 =
α
R1 ·prob{tˆ = t} if θT ≤ 1
0 if θT > 1.
(5)
In the intermediate- and the high-information regime we define
TAR2 := αR2 ·prob{tˆ = t|bˆ = b}+βR2 ·prob{tˆ = t|bˆ = b} (6)
in regime 2 and
TAR3 = αR3 ·prob{tˆ = t|bˆ = b}+βR31 ·prob{tˆ = t|bˆ = b,no correction}
+βR32 ·prob{tˆ = t|bˆ = b,correction}
(7)
in regime 3.
2. Lost tax revenue (LTR): The probability of taxing a type-t taxpayer who reports t
based on a reported tax valuation t can be interpreted as “lost tax revenue”. LTR
measures the fraction of tax evasion that is not detected by the tax auditor and
can be seen as an inverse measure of tax revenue. A low value of LTR implies a
high tax revenue, and vice versa. In the reduced-information regime we obtain
LTRR1 =
(1−α
R1)prob{t|tˆ = t} if θT ≤ 1
1
2 if θT > 1.
(8)
In the intermediate- and the high-information regimes, we define the measure as
LTRR2 :=(1−αR2) ·prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}
+(1−βR2) ·prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}
(9)
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and
LTRR3 = (1−αR3) ·prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}
+(1−βR31 ) ·prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t,no correction}
+(1−βR32 ) ·prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t,correction}.
(10)
in regime 3.
4 Tax auditors with high-powered incentives: no infor-
mation effect
In the following three sections, we will show how the changes in the measures of the
tax audit efficiency implied by variations in the information regimes critically depend
on the tax and statutory auditors’ incentives to provide an audit. We differentiate be-
tween high-powered incentives, medium incentives and low incentives. In our model,
the incentives for both auditors are represented (1) by the rewards for a successful au-
dit (represented by λ for the statutory auditor and δ for the tax auditor) and (2) by the
audit costs (CS and CT ). In addition to θT = CTδ−CT , it is useful to define
θS :=
CS
λ −CS (11)
as a measure of the statutory auditor’s incentives. Values of θS,T close to zero are
equivalent to high-powered incentives, increasing values imply medium and even lower
incentives. The following analysis reveals that θT and θS determine the equilibrium
audit and reporting decisions. As a consequence, the impact of different informa-
tion regimes on the efficiency measures also depends on these variables. Our analy-
sis concentrates on the tax auditor and, therefore, we focus on variations in θT . We
obtain different results for (1) high-powered incentives (0 < θT ≤ θT (θS), this sec-
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tion), (2) medium incentives (θT (θS) < θT ≤ 1, section 5) and (3) lower incentives
(1 < θT ≤ θT (θS), section 6), where the upper and lower bounds on θT depend on θS.
We restrict θS such that the statutory auditor exerts high effort (aS = 1) with positive
probability for at least report b, t or b, t.
Our discussion starts with a setting in which both auditors have high-powered incen-
tives. Appendices C.1.1 and C.2.1 show that for high-powered incentives the tax au-
ditor uses the same audit probability for all reports in all information regimes - that
means αR1 = αR2 = βR2 = αR3 = βR31 = β
R3
2 . With positive tax audit probabilities the
tax evasion probability is the same in all three information regimes by lemma 2. Also
the statutory auditor exerts high effort with equal probabilities xR21 = x
R2
2 = x
R3
1 = x
R3
2 .
Thus changes in the information regime have no effect on tax revenue and audit prob-
ability if tax and statutory auditors have strong incentives. The following proposition
2 states the result.
Proposition 2 (No information effect) There exist critical values θT ,θ S(θT ) such that
for 0 < θS < θ S and 0 < θT < θT (θS), the following relations hold:
1. LTRR1 = LTRR2 = LTRR3
2. TAR1 = TAR2 = TAR3.
Proof: See appendix D.4 
Note that the change from information regime 2 to regime 3 has no consequences for
the composition of the taxpayer’s equilibrium reporting. For example, taxpayer type
b, t will report b, t and b, t with positive probability in both regimes. However, the con-
crete reporting probabilities will not necessarily be the same in the two regimes. Firms
with b and t increase their tax compliance but firms with b and t will reduce com-
pliant reporting - see appendix C.1.1 and C.2.1 for the details. The differences stem
from the enriched tax auditor strategy: In the intermediate-information regime, the tax
auditor can condition his audit on low and high financial statement valuations. The
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high-information regime additionally allows for a distinction between a low financial
statement valuation that is corrected or uncorrected by the statutory auditor.
5 Tax auditors with medium incentives: mixed infor-
mation effects
What happens if the tax auditor’s incentives become weaker? First, the tax auditor uses
different audit strategies for different reports. Second, the taxpayer adjusts her equi-
librium reporting with respect to both financial statements and tax valuation. Finally,
these adjustments also affect the statutory auditor’s audit effort choice.
Tax auditors have intermediate incentives if the preference parameter δ together with
the personal audit cost CT result in θT such that θT ≤ θT < 1. Due to the existence
of different equilibria, we consider important financial statement valuation (γ < ω +
FB, regime 3a) and less important financial statement valuation (γ > ω +FB, regime
3b). The reduced incentives for the tax auditor have the following effects in the two
regimes:6
(1) Compared to a situation with high-powered incentives, the probability of false
reporting increases for all types except b, t. (2) Type b, t stops reporting truthfully and
type b, t starts to understate both valuations by reporting b, t with a positive probability.
Both types reduce the probability of reporting b, t. (3) The change in the reporting
profiles also induces changes in the audit probabilities. In both information regimes
the statutory auditor audits reports b, t with high effort (xR21 = x
R3
1 ) but stops auditing
reports b, t with high effort (xR22 = x
R3
2 = 0) because type b, t reduces the probability for
report b, t more than type b, t. The tax auditor decreases the audit probability of report
b, t in both information regimes (βR2 = βR31 ) while the audit probability for reports
6See appendix C.1.2 for the intermediate-information regime, appendix C.2.2 for the high-
information regime and γ >ω+FB and appendix C.2.4 for the high-information regime and γ <ω+FB.
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b, t remains the same as in the case with high auditor incentives (αR1 = αR2 = αR3).
Moreover, if information on statutory audit adjustments is available (regime 3) and
upward earnings management is detected the tax auditor further decreases the audit
probability for these reports (βR32 < β
R3
1 ).
The effect of lower tax auditor incentives on the efficiency measures in the two infor-
mation regimes depends on the relative importance of the financial statement valuation
for the taxpayer:
(1) Important financial statement valuation (γ < ω+FB, regime 3a): In regimes 2
and 3a, type b, t finds the report b, t more attractive than report b, t because the statutory
auditor may downgrade b, t to b, t. Thus she sacrifices the chance of a low tax valuation
to obtain a high financial statement valuation with certainty. As a consequence, the
probabilities for a report b, t sent by types b, t and b, t do not change from regime 2
to regime 3a because the potential senders of report b, t do not change. However, the
probability of an uncorrected report b, t with false tax values has to decrease in regime
3a. This is due to the observable correction activity of the statutory auditor: The tax
auditor can better conclude on types b, t and b, t. Therefore, both type t - taxpayers
decrease the probability of report b, t in regime 3a. Taken together, more information
induces lower tax evasion. Moreover, a report b, t corrected by the statutory auditor can
only stem from type b, t. Thus, the tax auditor can reduce the probability of auditing a
corrected report b, t to zero without any negative consequences regarding tax revenues.
Alltogether, lower tax evasion and lower audit acitivity in regime 3 explain the result
in Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 (Efficient information effect) Suppose γ < ω +FB. Then there exist
θT , θT , θ S(θT ), θ S(θT ) such that for θT < θT < θT ≤ 1 and θ S(θT )< θS < θ S(θT )
the following relations hold:
1. LTRR1 < LTRR3a < LTRR2 or LTRR3a < LTRR1 < LTRR2
2. TAR3a < TAR2 < TAR1.
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Proof: See appendix D.5. 
Intuitively, the high information content of the statutory auditor’s observable correc-
tions drives the result. In case of important financial statement valuation, corrected
financial statements together with a reported low tax valuation are a perfect indicator
for a truthful tax report. Therefore, the tax auditor will not audit these reports. How-
ever, uncorrected financial statements together with a reported low tax valuation also
become a much better indicator for misreporting. The tax auditor audits these reports,
and taxpayers with a high tax valuation reduce their probability of misreporting in
equilibrium. In sum, providing information about the statutory auditors corrections to
the tax auditor is efficient (compared to regime 2). The additional information will
induce both higher tax revenue and lower audit frequency.
In the reduced-information regime 1, both tax evasion and tax audit frequency are
higher than in regime 3a. However, tax audit frequency may dominate and induce
lower lost tax revenue compared to regime 3a. This explains why regime 3a is not
necessarily efficient with respect to the no information regime 1.
(2) Less important financial statement valuation (γ > ω +FB, regime 3b): In this
case the taxpayer has relatively strong preferences for a low tax valuation. Therefore
type b, t reports b, t and takes the risk of being corrected to b, t. This is the key dif-
ference from regimes 2 and 3a. The possibility of type b, t as a sender of report b, t
dampens the reporting probabilities for a report b, t sent by types b, t and b, t. More-
over, in contrast to regime 3a, the tax auditor will also audit the corrected report b, t
because a high tax valuation type may be the sender. Because all tax audit probabilities
for reports t are positive, lemma 2 applies. Thus in contrast to regime 3a, tax evasion
is not affected by providing access to the statutory audit report. However, tax revenues
decrease because the report b, t of type b, t is corrected to b, t by the statutory audi-
tor with positive probability and the taxpayer then benefits from the lower tax audit
probability (compared to report b, t).
The following proposition states the effects on the efficiency measures when financial
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statement valuation is relatively unimportant to the taxpayer.
Proposition 4 (Negative tax revenue effect) Suppose that γ > ω +FB. Then, there
exist θT , θT , θ S(θT ), θ S(θT ) such that for θT < θT < θT ≤ 1 and θ S(θT ) < θS <
θ S(θT ), the following relations hold:
1. LTRR1 < LTRR2 < LTRR3b
2. TAR3b < TAR2 < TAR1.
Proof: See appendix D.6 
The lower information content of the statutory auditor’s observable corrections is re-
sponsible for the difference between the efficiency result in proposition 3 and the neg-
ative tax revenue effect in proposition 4. Because of the less important financial state-
ment valuation, the taxpayer does not report a truthful high tax valuation to ensure
a favorable financial statement valuation. Therefore, a reported low tax valuation to-
gether with a corrected financial statement valuation will not perfectly indicate a truth-
ful tax report. As a consequence, the tax auditor audits with a lower, but positive audit
probability. Moreover, also a report with uncorrected low financial statement and low
tax valuation is less informative. As a consequence, tax evasion is higher in equilib-
rium compared to regime 3a. Thus more information decreases tax revenue and audit
frequency.
6 Low powered tax auditor incentives: positive tax rev-
enue effect
We now consider lower incentives for the tax auditor that are characterized by 1< θT <
θT . Compared to medium incentives, lower incentives have the following effects:7 (1)
7See appendix C.1.3 for the intermediate-information regime, appendix C.2.3 for the high-
information regime and γ >ω+FB and appendix C.2.4 for the high-information regime and γ <ω+FB.
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They increase the probability of false reporting with respect to tax and financial state-
ment valuation. (2) We observe changes in the reporting profiles: Taxpayer type b, t
stops truthful reporting in regimes 2 and 3b. In regime 3a truthful reporting is main-
tained due to the relative importance of financial statement valuation. Taxpayer type
b, t will no longer issue the report b, t in regime 2 and 3b. Again, the profile in regime
3a does not change due to the important financial statement valuation. (3) Changes in
the reporting profiles entail changes in the equilibrium tax audit probabilities, while
the statutory auditor’s behavior remains the same as in the case with medium incen-
tives for tax auditors. In regime 2, the tax auditor never audits any report b, t. Although
this report can be filed by two types with high tax valuation, the possibility of a true
or corrected report originated by type b, t is sufficient to justify the no audit decision.
This changes in both regimes 3a and 3b. In those cases, the tax auditor can observe
the statutory auditor’s correction of an overstated financial statement valuation. In the
event of a correction, the reporting probabilities for b, t and the statutory auditor’s cor-
rection probability x1 are determined such that the tax auditor has no incentive to audit
a corrected report. However, the tax auditor still prefers to audit an uncorrected report
b, t.
Proposition 5 demonstrates how the tax system’s efficiency measures vary with the
changes in the information environment.
Proposition 5 (Positive tax revenue effect) There exist 1 < θT < θ¯T and θ S(θT ) <
θS < θ S(θT ) such that
1. LTRR1 > LTRR2 > LTRR3a,R3b
2. TAR1 < TAR2 < TAR3a,R3b.
Proof: See appendix D.7. 
The reduced-information scenario (regime 1) induces the highest lost tax revenue and
the lowest audit frequency because the tax auditor terminates his audit activities and
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the taxpayer always understates his tax valuation. Providing more information to the
tax auditor, as in regimes 2 and 3, allows for more elaborated audit strategies. More
information has two effects on tax revenues and audit frequency that work in the same
directions: (1) The tax audit probabilities increase with more information and, thus, in-
crease audit frequency and increase tax revenue. (2) Taxpayers with high tax valuation
may deviate to reporting strategies with low tax valuation but lower audit risk. Then,
tax revenue and audit frequency decrease. With respect to tax revenues the first effect
dominates the second. Tax revenue increases with better information independent of
the relative importance of financial statement valuation. The same argument holds for
the tax audit frequency in the case of important financial statement valuation. Because
taxpayer types b, t and b, t report b, t with the same probability in regimes 2 and 3a, the
second effect is not strong enough to outweigh increased audit probability and thus au-
dit frequency increases. In regime 3b, taxpayer types b, t and b, t lower the probability
of report b, t compared to regime 2. However, audit frequency still increases because
of the higher audit probability for an uncorrected report b, t in regime 3b .
7 Conclusion
Is it possible to simultaneously increase tax revenues and reduce tax audit frequency
simply by providing the tax auditor with access to statutory audit adjustments? To ex-
amine this question, we integrate two novel features in a tax compliance game: In the
first modification of the standard inspection game, the tax auditor can observe the fi-
nancial statements that are already audited by a statutory auditor. The statutory auditor
is a strategic player who acts conservatively, i.e., he or she only corrects overstate-
ments. Thus firms can misreport both their book and their tax income. In the sec-
ond modification, we extend this model by assuming that the tax auditor additionally
receives a report from the statutory auditor that contains information on audit adjust-
ments regarding the firms’ book values. The report is an informative signal about the
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true tax values of a firm because a firm’s incentive to conduct upward management of
book values depends on the respective tax value.
If tax auditors have medium-powered incentives and firms place high weight on book
income, we indeed find that providing the tax auditor with access to statutory audit
adjustments reduces tax evasion and tax audit frequency and increases tax revenues.
In this case, granting access to statutory audit adjustments clearly improves the effi-
ciency of the tax audit regime. Information sharing between statutory and tax auditors
could therefore be an important but so far overlooked policy instrument to combat tax
evasion and increase the efficiency of tax audits. In particular, in countries such as
Canada or the United States, where private firms signal that they place high weight
on book income by voluntarily opting for an audit of their financial statements, the
obligation for auditors to share their information with tax auditors could improve tax
audit efficiency.
However, our model also highlights the limitations of this approach. We find that the
effect on tax audit efficiency strongly depends on the tax auditors’ incentives and the
importance that firms place on book income.
If tax auditors have medium-powered incentives but firms’ place a low weight on
book income, then tax revenues may even decrease because tax audit frequency de-
creases while average tax evasion is not affected by the additional information pro-
vision. Moreover, we obtain no effect on efficiency for high-powered tax auditor in-
centives. Highly motivated tax auditors do not decrease their audit frequency due to
the additional information, whereas firms’ change their evasion behavior. Increasing
the information level of the tax auditors induces some firms to engage in more tax
evasion, while other firms reduce their evasion. However, in equilibrium, average tax
evasion remains at the same level. Moreover, because highly motivated tax auditors
do not differentiate their audit probability with respect to book-tax differences, we do
not observe that firms conduct downward management of book income. Finally, for
low-powered tax auditor incentives, the audit frequency increases with increasing ad-
26
ditional information. This also raises tax revenues but the overall efficiency effect is
ambiguous.
Before giving tax auditors extended access to statutory audit information, the incen-
tives of tax auditors in the respective country should therefore be taken into account.
Moreover, countries should differentiate with respect to the type of firm, as the efficiency-
increasing effect requires firms to place high weight on book income.
The focus of this study is to examine the implications of additional information on tax
compliance and tax audit effectiveness. However, as we have seen, the strategic inter-
action between statutory auditors and tax auditors also affects firms’ financial report-
ing. Interestingly, the observability of the statutory audit report affects both downward
and upward earnings management of book income. Future research could investigate
these implications in greater detail and might also consider different incentives of the
statutory auditor, as we limit our analysis to conservative statutory auditors.
Moreover, our analysis concerns firms in which managers place greater weight on tax
savings than on the disclosure of high book income. Although we also study varia-
tions in the importance of book income, we explicitly exclude from our analysis those
firms that prioritize financial reporting over tax outcomes. Thus our analysis does not
fully cover public firms, which prior research finds place greater emphasis on finan-
cial reporting outcomes than private firms (Mills, 1998; Mills and Newberry, 2001;
Beuselinck et al., 2015; Lynch et al., 2018). Nevertheless, we can still transfer some of
our considerations to those firms that prioritize financial reporting over tax outcomes.
First, for tax auditors with high-powered incentives, the result that the additional in-
formation does not affect tax audit efficiency holds independent of the prioritization
of book and tax outcome. Second, firms that prioritize book over tax income will not
engage in downward book income management. Instead, we expect that some firms
would overstate tax income to conceal upward book income management (as reported
in Erickson et al. (2004) and modeled in Niggemann (2018)). This should expand the
settings in which additional information increases tax audit efficiency. Third, similar to
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our above analysis, we expect that additional information should, in general, increase
tax audit frequency and tax revenues if tax auditors have low-powered incentives. In
sum, when applied under the right conditions, information sharing between statutory
and tax auditor has the potential to significantly improve tax audit efficiency.
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Appendix
A List of variables
A.1 Taxpayer types and prior probabilities
Type Prior Probability
b, t 0.5p
b, t 0.5p
b, t 0.5(1− p)
b, t 0.5(1− p)
A.2 Objective function parameters
Taxpayer
ω financial statement valuation
γ tax valuation
FB penalty for incorrect financial stat. valuation
FT penalty for incorrect tax valuation
Statutory
auditor
λ return from detecting overstatement
CS auditing cost
} θS = CSλ−CS
Tax auditor
δ return from detecting understatement
CT auditing cost
} θT = CTδ−CT
A.3 Probabilities in mixed-strategy equilibria
Taxpayer
Type Report Report Probability
b, t b, t 1
b, t b, t 1−φ1−φ2
b, t φ1
b, t φ2
b, t b, t 1−η
b, t η
b, t b, t 1−ν1−ν2−ν3
b, t ν1
b, t ν2
b, t ν3
Statutory
auditor
x1 Statutory auditor audits report b with high effort given tax report t
x2 Statutory auditor audits report b with high effort given tax report t
Tax auditor
α Tax auditor audits t given report b, t (reg. 2 and 3)
β Tax auditor audits t given report b, t (reg. 2)
β1 Tax auditor audits t given uncorrected report b, t (reg. 3)
β2 Tax auditor audits t given corrected report b, t (reg. 3)
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B Legal obligations: Overview
Country
Obligation to file financial ac-
counting statements together
with the tax return
Obligation to file the audit report
together with the tax return
Australia Yes No3
Austria Yes No
Belarus Yes No
Belgium No Yes
Brazil Yes No
Canada Yes No
China Yes No3
Czech Republic Yes No
Denmark Yes No
Estonia No No
Finland Yes No
Germany Yes Yes
Hong Kong Yes Yes
Hungary No No
Ireland Yes Yes
Italy No No
Yespan Yes No
Korea No No
Luxembourg Yes No
Netherlands No No
Panama No No
Poland Yes1 Yes
Russia Yes No3
Slovakia No No
South Africa Yes Yes
Spain Yes No2
Sweden No No
Switzerland Yes No3
Ukraine Yes No
United Kingdom Yes Yes
Uruguay No No
USA No No
Vietnam Yes Yes
1 Non-audited financial statements do not need to be filed.
2 The audit report is a publicly available information.
3 Survey respondents state that in practice the audit report is often enclosed along with the financial
statements or that the revenue agency may request it as part of a tax audit.
Table 5: Legal obligations to file financial accounting statements and statutory auditor reports to the
tax administration. Data source: Own survey conducted between March and June 2016 among tax
managers, directors, and partners of PricewaterhouseCoopers.
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C Equilibrium analysis in regimes 2 and 3: the details
This appendix contains the detailed equilibrium analysis for both information regimes.
C.1 Equilibrium analysis in regime 2
We begin the analysis with the derivation of the taxpayer’s payoffs for those strategies
that are not dominated. These are given in Table 6.
Type Report Payoff
b, t b, t ωb− γt
b, t b, t ωb− γt
b, t ωb− γ(αt +(1−α)t)−αFT
b, t ωb− γ(β t +(1−β )t)−βFT
b, t b, t ωb− γt
b, t ω(x1b+(1− x1)b)− x1FB− γt
b, t b, t ωb− γt
b, t ω(x2b+(1− x2)b)− x2FB− γt
b, t ω(x1b + (1 − x1)b) − x1FB − x1(γ(β t + (1 − β )t) + βFT )− (1− x1)(γ(αt +(1−α)t)+αFT )
b, t ωb− γ(β t +(1−β )t)−βFT
Table 6: The taxpayer’s payoffs in the intermediate information regime (regime 2) depending on
type and report.
C.1.1 Equilibrium for high-powered tax auditor incentives
We first derive the equilibrium for low θT and low θS and present the restrictions for
θT and θS under which this equilibrium will be valid.
First, high powered-incentives imply positive audit probabilities for all conditions un-
der which an audit can take place. Therefore we conjecture x1 ∈ (0,1), x2 ∈ (0,1) as
well as α ∈ (0,1) and β ∈ (0,1). Under this conjecture reporting the truthful valuations
will be part of the equilibrium for the taxpayer. Then, the concrete audit probabilities
for both auditors can be derived from the following equilibrium conditions:
(1) The statutory auditor will set x1 and x2 such that
... Type b, t taxpayers are indifferent between reports b, t and b, t. Equating the
payoffs and rearranging yields x1 = ωω+FB .
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... Type b, t taxpayers are indifferent between reports b, t and b, t. This yields x2 =
x1.
(2) The tax auditor will set α and β such that
... Type b, t is indifferent between reporting b, t and b, t. Equating the respective
payoffs yields α = γγ+FT .
... Type b, t is indifferent between b, t and b, t yielding β = α . Moreover, α = β =
γ
γ+FT also make type b, t indifferent between reporting b, t and b, t.
(3) The conjectures and considerations above have shown that the taxpayer will use
an equilibrium strategy profile consisting of φ1 > 0,η > 0,ν1 > 0,ν2 > 0 and ν3 > 0.
These probabilities will be set such that the statutory and the tax auditor are indifferent
between their pure strategies. The auditors use Bayes’ rule when updating their beliefs
after observing a certain report. We obtain the following four equations to determine
five probabilities:
• The statutory auditor is indifferent between high and low effort after observing
report b, t. Updating leads to prob{b|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}= pη+(1−p)ν2pη+(1−p)ν2+1−p+pφ1 and
pη+(1− p)ν2 = θS(1− p+ pφ1). (12)
• The statutory auditor’s indifference given report b, t and updating beliefs to
prob{b|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}= ν1(1−p)ν1(1−p)+p(1−φ1) yields
ν1(1− p) = θS p(1−φ1). (13)
• The tax auditor being indifferent given report b, t and updating to prob{t|bˆ =
b, tˆ = t}= pφ1+(1−p)ν2(1−x1)pφ1+(1−p)ν2(1−x1)+1−p+pη(1−x1) yields
pφ1 +(1− p)ν2(1− x1) = θT (1− p+ pη(1− x1)). (14)
• The tax auditor being indifferent given report b, t and updating to prob{t|bˆ =
b, tˆ = t}= (1−p)(ν3+ν2x1)(1−p)(ν3+ν2x1)+p(1−η+ηx1) implies
(1− p)(ν3 +ν2x1) = θT p(1−η+ηx1). (15)
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Solving these equations for φ1,η ,ν1,ν2 and ν3 yields
φ1 =
(1− p)(θT (1+θS(1− x1))−ν2(1− x1)(1+θT ))
p(1−θSθT (1− x1))
η =
(1− p)(θS(1+θT )−ν2(1+θS(1− x1))
p(1−θSθT (1− x1))
ν1 =
θS((1− x1)(1+θT )(1− p)ν2−θTθS(1− x1)+(1+θT )p−θT )
(1− p)(1−θSθT (1− x1))
ν2 ∈ (ν2,ν2)
ν3 =
(1− p)((1− x1)θT (1+θS)− x1)ν2−θT ((1− x1)θS(1+θT − p)− p)
(1− p)(1−θSθT (1− x1)) .
(16)
The probability ν2 has to be set such that all other reporting probabilities are between
zero and one. Note that for sufficiently small θT ,θS all reporting probabilities are
between zero and one for ν2 = 0. Therefore, the lower bound ν2 will be zero. The
upper bound has to be determined from φ1(ν2)≥ 0,η(ν2)≥ 0,ν3(ν2)≥ 0 or ν1(ν2)+
ν2 +ν3(ν2)≤ 1.
Similar considerations yield restrictions on θT and θS defining the valid range of the
equilibrium:
1. The first boundary condition ensures positive probabilities: 1−θSθT (1− x1) >
0 ⇔ θT < 1θS(1−x1) .
2. A taxpayer of type b, t has the strongest incentives to deviate from truthful re-
porting. The report b, t will be part of the equilibrium as long as ν1+ν2+ν3 < 1.
Inserting and reformulating yields the implicit condition
(1− x1)(θ 2TθS +θTθ 2S )+(1− p)θTθS− p(1+θT +θS)+1
−(1− x1)(1+θT )(1+θS)(1− p)ν2 > 0.
(17)
Note that both conditions provide a valid space for θS and θT for all x1, p ∈ (0,1).
Condition 17 can be rearranged to
p <
1+θTθS +(1− x1)(θ 2TθS +θTθ 2S )− (1− x1)(1+θT )(1+θS)ν2
1+θTθS +θT +θS− (1− x1)(1+θT )(1+θS)ν2 < 1 (18)
and defines an upper bound for p. The RHS of (18) converges to 1 with θS,θT → 0.
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C.1.2 Equilibrium under medium tax auditor incentives
We conjecture x1 ∈ (0,1), x2 = 0, α ∈ (0,1) and β ∈ (0,1) as the equilibrium strate-
gies for the statutory and tax auditors. The probabilities can be determined from the
following:
(1) The statutory auditor will set x1 such that type b, t is indifferent between reporting
b, t and b, t. This yields x1 = ωω+FB .
(2) The tax auditor will set α and β such that
... Type b, t being indifferent between b, t and b, t yields α = γγ+FT .
• Type b, t is indifferent between b, t and b, t. This yields β = (γ−ω)γ+FT . These prob-
abilities imply that type b, t is also indifferent between reporting b, t and b, t.
Given the conjectures above, the taxpayer will use an equilibrium reporting profile with
φ1,φ2,η ,ν3 ∈ (0,1) and ν1 = 1− ν3 ∈ (0,1). Equating the payoffs for the statutory
and tax auditors for aS = 1,0 and aT = 1,0 and using Bayes’ rule gives three equations
that can be used to determine the four equilibrium reporting probabilities.
• The statutory auditor being indifferent given b, t and prob{b|bˆ = b, tˆ = t} =
pη
pη+1−p+pφ1 yields
pη = θS(1− p+ pφ1). (19)
• The tax auditor being indifferent given b, t and prob{t|bˆ= b, tˆ = t}= φ1 pφ1 p+pη(1−x1)+1−p
implies
φ1 p = θT (pη(1− x1)+1− p). (20)
• The tax auditor being indifferent given b, t and prob{t|bˆ= b, tˆ = t}= pφ2+(1−p)ν3pφ2+(1−p)ν3+p(1−η+ηx1)
implies
pφ2 +(1− p)ν3 = θT p(1−η+ηx1). (21)
The solution to this system of three equations is
φ1 =
(1− p)θT (1+θS(1− x1))
p(1−θSθT (1− x1))
φ2 ∈ (φ2,φ2)
η =
(1− p)θS(1+θT )
p(1−θSθT (1− x1))
ν3 =
θT (p− (1− x1)θS((1+θT )− p))
(1− p)(1−θSθT (1− x1)) −φ2
p
1− p
(22)
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The equilibrium derived above will be valid if the following conditions are fulfilled:
1. Our conjecture x2 = 0 must be fulfilled. Using prob{b|bˆ= b, tˆ = t}= (1−p)(1−ν3)(1−ν3)(1−p)+p(1−φ1−φ2)
yields (1−ν3)(1− p)< θS(1−φ1−φ2). Inserting ν3, φ1 and φ2 = 0 yields
(1− x1)(θ 2TθS +θTθ 2S )+(1− p)θTθS− p(1+θT +θS)+1 < 0, (23)
which replicates the LHS of condition (17) at ν2 = 0.
2. Reformulating ν3 ≤ 1 using φ2 = 1−φ1 yields the condition θT ≤ 1.
3. Reformulating η ≤ 1 yields θS ≤ p1+θT−p(1+θT x1) . Tedious algebra shows that
this condition implies φ1 ≤ 1 provided θT ∈ (0,1).
The lower and upper bounds for φ2 will be determined as follows: (1) ν3 ≤ 1 yields
φ2 ≥ (1+θT )p−(1+θ
2
TθS(1−x1))
p(1−θTθS(1−x1)) . Combining this with condition φ2 ≥ 0 we obtain:
φ
2
(·) = max
{
0,
(1+θT )p− (1+θ 2TθS(1− x1))
p(1−θTθS(1− x1))
}
. (24)
(2) φ2 has to be determined such that (23) holds. Inserting and rearranging leads to
φ2 ≤ p(θT+θS)−(1−x1)(θ
2
TθS+θTθ
2
S )−(1−p)(1+θTθS)
p(1+θS)(1−θSθT (1−x1)) . (3) Reformulating ν3 ≥ 0 yields φ2 ≤
θT (p−(1−x1)θS((1+θT )−p))
p(1−θTθS(1−x1)) . The minimum of the two expressions above determines the
upper bound φ2.
C.1.3 Equilibrium under low tax auditor incentives
Under weaker incentives, the tax auditor will not audit report b, t or b, t. We conjecture
that α > 0 and β = 0 because the taxpayer has stronger incentives for the former report.
We also guess x1 > 0 and x2 = 0. The probabilities can be determined as follows:
(1) The audit probability x1 will make type b, t indifferent between reports b, t and b, t.
Therefore, x1 = ωω+FB .
(2) The tax audit probability α is set such that b, t is indifferent between b, t and b, t.
We obtain α = ωγ+FT .
(3) Given these considerations, the taxpayer’s equilibrium profile will consist of φ1 >
0, φ2 = 1− φ1, η > 0 and ν3 = 1. We can determine the two probabilities from two
equilibrium conditions:
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• The statutory auditor is indifferent between aS = 1 and aS = 0. Using prob{b|bˆ=
b}= pηpη+1−p+pφ1) yields
η =
θS(1− p+ pφ1)
p
. (25)
• Tax auditor indifference and prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}= pφ1pφ1+1−p+pη(1−x1) imply
φ1 = θT
(
1− p+ pη(1− x1)
p
)
. (26)
Solving these two equations with respect to η and φ1 yields
η =
θS(1+θT )(1− p)
p(1−θSθT (1− x1))
φ1 =
θT (1− p)(1+θS(1− x1))
p(1−θSθT (1− x1)) .
(27)
(4) The following equilibrium conditions have to hold:
1. Our conjecture β = 0 has to be valid. Bayesian updating leads to
δ
(1−φ1)p+1− p
(1−φ1)p+1− p+ p(1−η(1− x1)) −CT ≤ 0 ⇔ θT ≥ 1. (28)
2. η > 0 and φ1 > 0 yields θS ≤ 1θT (1−x1) .
3. η ≤ 1 yields the stricter condition θS ≤ p1−p+θT (1−px1) and φ1 ≤ 1 ⇔ θT ≤
p
1−p+θS(1−x1) gives the upper bound for θT . If θT or θS exceed these upper
bounds, the tax or statutory auditors will no longer audit because their incen-
tives are too low.
C.2 Equilibrium analysis in the high-information regime
In Table 7 we present the taxpayer’s payoffs for those strategies that are not dominated
in information regime 3.
C.2.1 High-powered tax auditor incentives
As in regime 2, we conjecture that both auditors will exhibit positive probabilities for
aS = 1 and aT = 1 whenever b or t is observed. Therefore, x1 ∈ (0,1), x2 ∈ (0,1),
α ∈ (0,1), β1 ∈ (0,1) and β2 ∈ (0,1). We derive the following probabilities:
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Type Report Payoff
b, t b, t ωb− γt
b, t b, t ωb− γt
b, t ωb− γ(αt +(1−α)t)−αFT
b, t ωb− γ(β1t +(1−β1)t)−β1FT
b, t b, t ωb− γt
b, t ω(x1b+(1− x1)b)− x1FB− γt
b, t b, t ωb− γt
b, t ω(x2b+(1− x2)b)− x2FB− γt
b, t ω(x1b+(1− x1)b)− x1FB− x1(γ(β2t +(1−β2)t)+β2FT )− (1− x1)(γ(αt +(1−α)t)+αFT )
b, t ωb− γ(β1t +(1−β1)t)−β1FT
Table 7: The taxpayer’s payoffs in the high-information regime (regime 3) depending on type and
report
(1) The statutory auditor will set x1 and x2 such that
... Type b, t taxpayers are indifferent between reports b, t and b, t. Equating the
payoffs and rearranging yields x1 = ωω+FB .
... Type b, t taxpayers are indifferent between reports b, t and b, t. This yields x2 =
x1.
(2) The tax auditor will set α and β1,β2 such that
... Type b, t is indifferent between reporting b, t and b, t. Equating the respective
payoffs yields α = γγ+FT .
... Type b, t is indifferent between b, t and b, t yielding β1 = α .
... Type b, t is also indifferent between b, t and b, t. This yields
ωb− γt =ω(x1b+(1− x1)b)− x1FB− x1(γ(β2t +(1−β2)t)+β2FT )
− (1− x1)(γ(αt +(1−α)t)+αFT )
⇔ γt =γ(β2t +(1−β2)t)−β2FT ⇔ β2 = β1 = α.
(29)
(3) The conjectures and considerations above have shown that the taxpayer will use
an equilibrium strategy profile consisting of φ1 > 0,η > 0,ν1 > 0,ν2 > 0 and ν3 > 0.
Using Bayes’ rule, we obtain the following equations from the tax and the statutory
auditors’ indifference conditions:
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• The statutory auditor is indifferent given b, t. The updated probability prob{b|bˆ=
b, tˆ = t}= pη+(1−p)ν2pη+(1−p)ν2+1−p+pφ1 yields
pη+(1− p)ν2 = θS(1− p+ pφ1). (30)
• The statutory auditor being indifferent after report b, t and prob{b|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}=
ν1(1−p)
ν1(1−p)+p(1−φ1) implies
ν1(1− p) = θS p(1−φ1). (31)
• Tax auditor indifference after b, t and probability update prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t} =
pφ1+(1−p)ν2(1−x1)
pφ1+(1−p)ν2(1−x1)+1−p+pη(1−x1) result in
pφ1 +(1− p)ν2(1− x1) = θT (1− p+ pη(1− x1)). (32)
• The tax auditor is indifferent after observing b, t without corrections by the
statutory auditor. The posterior probability prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t, no correction}=
(1−p)ν3
(1−p)ν3+p(1−η) leads to
(1− p)ν3 = θT p(1−η) (33)
• The tax auditor is indifferent between audit and not audit after report b, t is cor-
rected from original report b to b. The posterior probability prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ =
t, correction}= (1−p)x1ν2(1−p)x1ν2+x1 pη yields
(1− p)x1ν2 = θT x1 pη . (34)
Equations (30) to (34) have the following solution:
φ1 =
1− p
p
θT
η =
1− p
p
θS
ν1 =
θS(p(1+θT )−θT )
1− p
ν2 = θSθT
ν3 =
θT (p(1+θS)−θS)
1− p
(35)
(4) The following conditions for θT and θS have to be met to ensure the existence of
the equilibrium:
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1. φ1 ≤ 1 ⇔ θT ≤ p1−p . This also implies ν1 ≥ 0.
2. η ≤ 1 ⇔ θS ≤ p1−p . This implies ν3 ≥ 0.
3. The condition ν1 +ν2 +ν3 ≤ 1 leads to the constraint
θT ≤ 1− p(1+θS)p(1+θS)−θS . (36)
C.2.2 Medium incentives for the tax auditor and unimportant financial state-
ment valuation
If the tax auditor’s incentives become less high powered, θT will increase beyond the
upper bound outlined in section C.2.1. Then, the equilibrium depends on the relative
magnitude of the preference parameters γ and ω . We first consider the case of γ >
ω+FB. Since tax valuation is very important, a report of b, t will be less attractive for
type b, t, and therefore, we conjecture that x2 = 0 and x1,α,β1,β2 ∈ (0,1).
Given these conjectures, the equilibrium mixed strategy probabilities can be computed:
(1) As above, the probability x1 = ωω+FB ensures that type b, t will be indifferent be-
tween reports b, t and b, t.
(2) The tax auditor’s equilibrium audit probabilities will be set such that
... Type b, t is indifferent between reporting b, t and b, t. Equating the respective
payoffs yields α = γγ+FT .
... Type b, t is indifferent between reports b, t and b, t. This yields β1 =
(γ−ω)
γ+FT . Note
that α and β1 imply that type b, t will also be indifferent between reports b, t and
b, t.
... In equilibrium, β2 will be such that type b, t is indifferent between reports b, t and
b, t. We obtain β2 =
(γx1−ω)
x1(γ+FT )
. Note that β2 > 0 ⇔ γx1−ω > 0 ⇔ γ > ω+FB.
(3) The conjectures above lead to φ1,φ2,η ,ν2,ν3 and ν1 = 1−ν2−ν3 ∈ (0,1). These
probabilities have to be computed from the following four equations derived from
statutory and tax auditor indifference and Bayes’ rule:
pη+(1− p)ν2 = θS(1− p+ pφ1)
pφ1 +(1− p)ν2(1− x1) = θT (1− p+ pη(1− x1)).
(1− p)x1ν2 = θT x1 pη .
pφ2 +(1− p)ν3 = θT p(1−η)
(37)
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The solution of system (37) is given by
φ1 =
1− p
p
θT
φ2 ∈ (φ2(θT ),φ2(θT ))
η =
1− p
p
θS
ν2 = θSθT
ν3 =
θT (p(1+θS)−θS)− pφ2
1− p .
(38)
(4) The following conditions ensure that the strategies computed above constitute an
equilibrium:
1. The conjecture x2 = 0 must hold under the given equilibrium. Using prob{b|bˆ =
b, tˆ = t}= (1−p)(1−ν2−ν3)(1−p)(1−ν2−ν3)+p(1−φ1−φ2) yields
λprob{b|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}−CS < 0 ⇔ (1− p)(1−ν2−ν3)< θS p(1−φ1−φ2).
(39)
Inserting and rearranging yields
θT >
1− p(1+θS)(1−φ2)
p(1+θS)−θS . (40)
(5) Using the lower bound φ2 = 0 reproduces the RHS of condition (36). Rear-
ranging the inequality to φ2 yields φ2(θT ).
2. Moreover, ν2 +ν3 ≤ 1 must hold. Inserting yields
ν2 +ν3 =
p(θT −φ2)
1− p ≤ 1 ⇔ θT ≤
1− p
p
+φ2. (41)
We insert the maximum value for φ2 = 1−φ1 and obtain the upper bound θT ≤ 1.
C.2.3 Low incentives for the tax auditor and unimportant financial statement
valuation
We now consider the case θT > 1 and γ > ω+FB. We conjecture α,β1 and x1 ∈ (0,1)
and that x2 = β2 = 0. We furthermore suppose that type b, t never reports truthfully
and never reports b, t.
(1) The probability x1 is determined as above (see section C.2.1).
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(2) In equilibrium, α and β1 will be set such that (1) type b, t is indifferent between
reports b, t and b, t and (2) type b, t is indifferent between reporting b, t and b, t. We
obtain the two equations
ωb− γ(αt +(1−α)t)−αFT = ωb− γ(β1t +(1−β1)t)−β1FT
ωb− γ(β1t +(1−β1)t)−β1FT = ω(x1b+(1− x1)b)− x1FB− x1γt
− (1− x1)(γ(αt +(1−α)t)+αFT )
(42)
and the solution
α =
ω
x1(γ+FT )
und β1 =
1− x1
x1
ω
γ+FT
. (43)
(3) We show that type b, t indeed prefers report b, t over b, t with α,β1 and x1 as given
above: Inserting and rearranging (use ω(x1b+(1− x1)b)− x1FB = ωb because of x1)
ωb− γt < ωb− x1γt− (1− x1)(γ(αt +(1−α)t)+αFT ) (44)
yields the condition γ > ω+FB which is fulfilled by the assumption above.
(4) The taxpayer’s reporting probabilities will be determined from
η p+(1− p)(1−ν3) = θS(1− p+ pφ1),
φ1 p+(1− p)(1−ν3)(1− x1) = θT (1− p+ pη(1− x1)),
p(1−φ1)+(1− p)ν3 = θT p(1−η),
(45)
and amount to
φ1 =
θT (1− px1)− (1− x1)
px1
η =
(1− p)θTθS +(2− p)θSx1 +θT −θS−1
px1(1+θT )
ν3 =
θ 2TθS(px1−1)+θTθS(px1−2x1 +1)+ x1(1− p)(1+θT )+θT −1
x1(1− p)(1+θT )
(46)
(5) The equilibrium will be valid if the following conditions hold:
• The tax auditor will not audit in case of a report b, t (where b comes from a
correction by the statutory auditor) if δprob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t,correction}−CT < 0.
Using prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t,correction} = (1−p)(1−ν3)(1−p)(1−ν3)+p(1−φ1) and reformulating
yields θT > 1.
• Reformulating φ1 ≤ 1 yields θT ≤ 1−x1(1−p)1−x1 p > 1.
45
• Reformulating ν3 ≤ 1 yields θS ≥ θT−1θT (θT+2x1−1−px1(1+θT ))
C.2.4 Medium and low incentives for the tax auditor and important financial
statement valuation
Important financial statement valuation for the taxpayer is represented by condition
γ < ω +FB. Our equilibrium conjecture for the two auditors is as in section C.2.3,
which means α,β1,x1 ∈ (0,1) and x2 = β2 = 0. The taxpayer’s preferences induce an
important difference: If the financial statement valuation is important for the taxpayer,
he will have incentives to avoid a strict statutory audit. Therefore, due to x2 = 0 type
b, t will report b, t instead of b, t. We determine the audit and reporting probabilities as
follows:
(1) The statutory auditor’s high effort probability x1 is determined as above (see section
C.2.1).
(2) The tax audit probability α will make type b, t indifferent between reporting b, t
and b, t. We obtain α = γγ+FT . The second probability β1 is set such that type b, t will
be indifferent between b, t and b, t. This implies β1 =
(γ−ω)
γ+FT . Note that α and β1 also
induce indifference between b, t, b, t and b, t.
(3) We show that type b, t indeed prefers report b, t over b, t under the audit probabili-
ties given above: Inserting yields
ωb− γt > ωb− x1γt− (1− x1)γs ⇔ ω > γx1 ⇔ γ < ω+FB. (47)
This is exactly the condition given above.
(4) The conjectures above yield φ1,φ2,η ,ν3,ν1 = 1−ν3 > 0. From statutory and tax
auditor indifference together with Bayes’ rule we obtain the following three equations
to compute the concrete probabilities:
η p = θS(φ1 p+(1− p))
φ1 p = θT ((1− x1)η p+1− p)
(1− p)ν3 + pφ2 = θT p(1−η)
(48)
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The solution to this system is
φ1 =
(1− p)θT (1+θS(1− x1))
p(1−θSθT (1− x1))
φ2 ∈ (φ2,φ2)
η =
(1− p)θS(1+θT )
p(1−θSθT (1− x1))
ν3 =
θT (p−θS((1+θT )− p− x1θT p))
(1− p)(1−θSθT (1− x1)) −φ2
p
1− p .
(49)
(5) The following conditions ensure that the audit and reporting probabilities derived
above are an equilibrium:
• ν3 ≤ 1 ⇔ θS ≥ θT−1θT (θT+2x1−1−px1(1+θT ))
• φ1 ≤ 1 ⇔ θT ≤ p1−p+θS(1−x1)
• η ≤ 1 ⇔ θT ≤ p−θS(1−p)θS(1−px1)
D Proofs
D.1 Proof of proposition 1
The tax auditor’s equilibrium audit probability can be derived from the indifference of
a type-t taxpayer between truthful reporting and report t. Reformulating
γt = αR1(γt +FT )+(1−αR1)γt (50)
yields
αR1 =
γ
γ+FT
. (51)
With prob{t = t|tˆ = t} = θT1+θT a type-t taxpayer’s reporting strategy θT =
CT
δ−CT is
obtained by rearranging
θT
1+θT
(δ −CT )+ 11+θT (−CT ) = 0. (52)
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D.2 Proof of lemma 1
The first three statements follow directly from the preferences of the tax and statutory
auditors. A taxpayer of type b, t will never report b, t because this report is dominated
by the (truthful) report b, t. By the same argument, a taxpayer of type b, t will never
report b, t. The report b, t is also dominated by truth reporting, because ω < γ . 
D.3 Proof of lemma 2
Part 1: In case of the reduced-information setting (regime R1), we obtain
TER1 =
{
1
2θT if θT < 1
1
2 if θT ≥ 1.
(53)
We now look at regimes 2 and 3. In a mixed-strategy equilibrium the taxpayer’s equi-
librium reporting strategies have to ensure that the tax auditor is indifferent between
auditing and not auditing a certain report. The indifference conditions for the tax au-
ditor in the intermediate-information regime (regime 2) yield the following two equa-
tions:
Indifference at report t,b (αR2 > 0) ⇔ δprob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}−CT = 0.
Indifference at report t,b (βR2 > 0) ⇔ δprob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}−CT = 0.
(54)
Inserting the probabilities
prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}= prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}
prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}+prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b} (55)
and
prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}= prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}
prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}+prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b} (56)
yields the following two equations (again with θT = CTδ−CT ):
prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}= θT prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}
prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}= θT prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}
(57)
Summing these two equations yields8
prob{t, tˆ = t}= TER2 = θT prob{t}= 12θT . (58)
8Note that prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}+prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}= prob{t, tˆ = t}= prob{t} because type t will
never overstate the tax valuation, see lemma 1.
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In regime 3 the conditional probability of t given a tax report t and a financial statement
valuation b depends on the statutory auditor’s work observable to the tax auditor. The
financial statement valuation may be corrected from b to b as a result of the statutory
auditor’s pressure ("correction"’) or not ("no correction"). We obtain the probabilities
prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}= prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}
prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}+prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}
prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t, no corr.}= prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b, no corr.}
prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b, no corr.}+prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b, no corr.}
prob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t, corr.}= prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b, corr.}
prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b, corr.}+prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b, corr.}
(59)
Suppose again that the tax auditor is indifferent between auditing and not auditing at
the three possible outcomes of the audited financial statement valuation. We obtain the
equations
αR3 > 0 ⇔ prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}= θT prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b}
βR31 > 0 ⇔ prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b, no corr.}= θT prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b, no corr.}
βR32 > 0 ⇔ prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b, corr.}= θT prob{t, tˆ = t|bˆ = b, corr.}
(60)
Summing the three equations again yields
prob{t, tˆ = t}= TER3 = θT prob{t}= 12θT . (61)
Part 2: Suppose, for example, βR22 = 0. In this case, the corresponding equation
changes to δprob{t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t}−CT < 0. Summing both sides of the equation corre-
sponding to αR2 > 0 and the inequality yields TE < 12θT . The same argument holds if
αR1,αR2 or one the three audit probabilities in regime 3 are equal to zero.

D.4 Proof of proposition 2
The equilibrium analysis (see Appendix C) reveals that for θS and θT close to zero the
equilibrium in each regime is characterized by
1. Regime 2: αR2 = βR2 = γγ+FT .
2. Regime 3: αR3 = βR31 = β
R3
2 =
γ
γ+FT .
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Therefore, lemma 2 immediately implies that TER1 = TER2 = TER3 = 12θT . Then we
obtain TA = 12
γ
γ+FT (1+θT ) and TR =
1
2
FT
γ+FT θT in all three regimes.
The upper bounds θ¯T and θ¯S(θT ) are given in Appendix C.1.1 and C.2.1. 
D.5 Proof of proposition 3
Appendix C (see sections C.1.2 and C.2.4) provides the following properties with re-
spect to audit and reporting probabilities for the relevant equilibria in regime 2 and
regime 3a:
1. αR2 = αR3a, βR2 = βR3a1 and β
R3a
2 = 0.
2. φR21 = φ
R3a
1 , η
R2 = ηR3a and νR22 = ν
R3a
2 = 0.
Moreover, xR21 = x
R3a
1 =: x1.
Then the tax revenue measure in regime 2 and 3a can be written as
LTRR2 =
1−αR2
2
pφR21 +
1−βR21
2
(2TER2− pφR21 ) (62)
LTRR3a =
1−αR3a
2
pφR3a1 +
1−βR3a1
2
(2TER3a− pφR3a1 ) (63)
Since all parameters in the two expressions except the tax evasion probability TE
are the same and TER3a < 12θT = TE
R2 due to lemma 2, the property LTRR3a <
LTRR2 is obvious. Moreover, because βR2 < αR2 = αR1 we also establish LTRR2 >
1−αR2
2 (2TE
R2) = 1−α
R2
2 θT =
1−αR1
2 θT = LTR
R1.
The audit frequency measures in the two regimes are
TAR2 =
αR2
2
(1− p)+ β
R2
2
(2TER2 + p)+
αR2−βR2
2
(pφR21 + pη
R2(1− x1)) (64)
TAR3a =
αR3a
2
(1− p)+ β
R3a
2
(2TER3a + p)+
αR3a−βR3a
2
(pφR3a1 + pη
R3a(1− x1))
(65)
Again, equal audit and reporting probabilities in the two regimes and the fact that
TER3a < 12θT = TE
R2 imply TAR3a < TAR2. Moreover, because βR2 < αR2 = αR1 we
obtain TAR2 < α
R1
2 (1+θT ) = TA
R1. 
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D.6 Proof of proposition 4
Appendix C (sections C.1.2 and C.2.2) shows that the tax auditor’s audit probabilities
for θT < θT < θT ≤ 1 are given by
Regime 2 Regime 3b
α γγ+FT
γ
γ+FT
β /β1
(γ−ω)
γ+FT
(γ−ω)
γ+FT
β2 -
(γx1−ω)
x1(γ+FT )
in the intermediate- and the high-information regimes. Moreover, xR21 = x
R3b
1 =: x1.
First note that βR3b2 < β
R3b
1 . Furthermore, lemma 2 applies because of the strictly
positive audit probabilities. Therefore,
LTRR2 =
1−αR2
2
(pφR21 +(1− p)νR22 (1− x1))+
1−βR2
2
(2TER2− pφR21 − (1− p)νR22 (1− x1))
=
1−βR2
2
θT − α
R2−βR2
2
(pφR21 +(1−νR22 )(1− x1)).
(66)
The claim LTRR1 < LTRR2 follows from αR1 = αR2 > βR2, implying
LTRR2 >
1−αR2
2
θT =
1−αR1
2
θT = LTRR1. (67)
Furthermore, LTRR3b > 1−β
R3b
1
2 θT −
αR3b−βR3b1
2 (pφ
R3b
1 +(1− p)νR3b2 (1− x1)) because
βR3b1 > β
R3b
2 .
Similarly, the tax audit probability TA can be written as
TAR2 =
αR2
2
(1− p)+ β
R2
2
(2TER2+ p)+
αR2−βR2
2
(pφR21 +(1− p)νR22 (1−x1)+ pηR2(1−x1)).
(68)
As above, αR1 = αR2, αR2 > βR2 and 2TER2 = θT imply
TAR2 <
αR2
2
(1− p)+ α
R2
2
(θT + p) =
αR1
2
(1+θT ) = TAR1. (69)
Again, βR3b1 > β
R3b
2 also implies TA
R3 < α
R3b
2 (1− p)+
βR3b1
2 (2TE
R3b+ p)+ α
R3b−βR3b1
2 (pφ
R3b
1 +
(1− p)νR3b2 (1− x1)+ pηR3b(1− x1)).
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Obviously, pφR21 +(1− p)νR22 (1−x1)≥ pφR3b1 +(1− p)νR3b2 (1−x1) and ηR2 ≥ ηR3b
is sufficient to prove LTRR2 < LTRR3b and TAR2 > TAR3b.
Appendix C provides the reporting probabilities in the two regimes:
Regime 2 Regime 3b
φ1
(1−p)θT (1+θS(1−x1))
p(1−θSθT (1−x1))
1−p
p θT
ν2 0 θSθT
η (1−p)θS(1+θT )p(1−θSθT (1−x1))
1−p
p θS
The inequality pφR21 +(1− p)(1− x1)νR22 > pφR3b1 +(1− p)(1− x1)νR3b2 reduces to
1> 1−θWθT (1−x1) and is true for θT ,θS < 1. Furthermore, ηR2 > ηR3b is equivalent
to θT >−θSθT (1−x1) which is clearly fulfilled because of θS,θT > 0 and x1 ∈ (0,1).
This completes the proof. 
D.7 Proof of proposition 5
The claims LTRR1 > LTRR2 and TAR1 < TAR2 are obvious because the lost tax revenue
measure LTR can never exceed 12 and the audit frequency TA will never be lower than
zero. However, these are the values for LTR and TA in the reduced information regime
for θT > 1.
The comparison of the intermediate- and the high-information regimes is much more
intricate. Appendix C (specifically C.1.3, C.2.4, C.2.3) shows that the tax auditor’s
audit probabilities for 1 < θT < θ¯T are given by
Regime 2 Regime 3a (γ < ω+FB) Regime 3b (γ ≥ ω+FB)
x1 ωω+FB see Regime 2 see Regime 2
x2 0 0 0
α ωγ+FT
γ
γ+FT
ω
x1(γ+FT )
.
β/β1 0
(γ−ω)
γ+FT
(1−x1)ω
x1(γ+FT )
β2 – 0 0
We use xR21 = x
R3a
1 = x
R3b
1 =: x1 in the following anaylsis. Appendix C (specifically
C.1.3, C.2.4, C.2.3) also provides the relevant reporting probabilities as given in the
following table:
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Regime 2 Regime 3a Regime 3b
φ1
θT (1−p)(1+θS(1−x1))
p(1−θSθT (1−x1)) see Regime 2
θT (1−px1)−(1−x1)
px1
φ2 1−φR21 φR3a2 ∈ (φ2,φ2) 1−φR3b1
ν2 0 0 1−νR3b3
ν3 1 νR3a3 ν
R3b
3
η θS(1+θT )(1−p)p(1−θSθT (1−x1)) see Regime 2
(1−p)θTθS+(2−p)θSx1+θT−θS−1
px1(1+θT )
Furthermore,
νR3a3 =
θT (p−θS((1+θT )− p− x1θT p))
(1− p)(1−θSθT (1− x1)) −φ
R3a
2
p
1− p and (70)
νR3b3 =
θ 2TθS(px1−1)+θTθS(px1−2x1 +1)+ x1(1− p)(1+θT )+θT −1
x1(1− p)(1+θT ) . (71)
We begin with the comparison between Regime 2 and Regime 3b. LTRR2 can be
written as
1−αR2
2
pφR21 +
1
2
(1− pφR21 ) =
1
2
− α
R2
2
pφR21 . (72)
Using αR3b = α
R2
x1
and βR3b1 =
(1−x1)αR2
x1
the term LTRR3b can be simplified to
LTRR3b =
1−αR3b
2
(pφR3b1 +(1− p)(1− x1)(1−νR3b3 ))+
1−βR3b1
2
(p(1−φR3b1 )+(1− p)νR3b3 )
=
1
2
(p+(1− p)((1− x1)(1−νR3b3 )+νR3b3 ))
− 1
x1
αR2
2
(pφR3b1 +(1− p)(1− x1)(1−νR3b3 )+(1− x1)(p(1−φR3b1 )+(1− p)νR3b3 ))
=
1
2
(p+(1− p)(1− x1(1−νR3b3 )))−
αR2
2
(
pφR3b1 +
1− x1
x1
)
(73)
Reformulating the claim that LTRR2 > LTRR3b yields
1−αR2 pφR21 ≥ p+(1− p)(1− x1(1−νR3b3 ))−αR2
(
pφR3b1 +
1− x1
x1
)
⇔ (1− p)x1νR3b3 ≤ αR2
(
pφR3b1 +
1− x1
x1
− pφR21
)
+(1− p)x1
⇔ νR3b3 ≤ 1+
αR2
(1− p)x1
(
pφR3b1 +
1− x1
x1
− pφR21
)
.
(74)
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This claim will always be true, if the term in brackets on the RHS of the inequality
above is positive. Inserting and rearranging
pφR3b1 +
1− x1
x1
− pφR21 > 0 (75)
yields the claim
θS <
1
θT + x1(1− p(1+θT )) . (76)
We now show that parameter condition (76) is implied by the equilibrium entry terms.
Consider the condition ηR2 ≤ 1 ⇔ θS(1+θT )(1−p)p(1−θSθT (1−x1)) ≤ 1. Rearranging with respect to
θS yields the condition
θS ≤ p1+θT − p(1+θT x1) . (77)
We show that (77) is stricter than (76), because
p
1+θT − p(1+θT x1) <
1
θT + x1(1− p(1+θT )) (78)
is equivalent to θT > −1 which is clearly true. This completes the proof of the first
part of the proposition.
The second part of the proposition states that LTRR3b < LTRR2 comes with TAR3b >
TAR2. We can write TAR2 as
TAR2 =
αR2
2
(1− p+ pφR21 + p(1− x1)ηR2). (79)
Using αR3b = α
R2
x1
and βR3b1 =
(1−x1)αR2
x1
, the tax audit probability TAR3b is given by
TAR3b =
1
2
αR2
x1
(
1− p+ pφR3b1 + p(1− x1)ηR3b +(1− p)(1− x1)(1−νR3b3 )
)
+
1
2
(1− x1)αR2
x1
(
p(1−φR3b1 )+ p(1−ηR3b)+(1− p)νR3b3
)
=
αR2
2
(
pφR3b1 +
2− x1(1+ p)
x1
)
.
(80)
Inserting φR21 , φ
R3b
1 and η
R2 and rearranging TAR3b > TAR2 yields condition (76):
θS <
1
θT + x1(1− p(1+θT )) . (81)
We have shown above that this condition is implied by the claim ηR2 < 1.
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We now proceed with the comparison between regime 2 and regime 3a. We obtain
LTRR3a =
1−αR3a
2
pφR3a1 +
1−βR3a1
2
((1− p)νR3a3 + pφR3a2 ) (82)
Since αR3a < αR2, βR3a1 < β and φ
R2
1 = φ
R3a
1 , a sufficient condition for LTR
R2 >
LTRR3a is
1− pφR3a1 ≥ (1− p)νR3a3 + pφR3a2 . (83)
The RHS of inequality (83) does not depend on φR3a2 because
1−p
p φ
R3a
2 is subtracted in
νR3a3 . We can therefore insert φ
R3a
2 = 1−φR3a1 without loss of generality and obtain
1− pφR3a1 ≥ (1− p)νR3a3
∣∣
φR3a2 =1−φR3a1 + p(1−φ
R3a
1 ) ⇔ νR3a3
∣∣
φR3a2 =1−φR3a1 ≤ 1. (84)
This is a necessary condition that has to be fulfilled in the equilibrium because νR3a3
decreases in φR3a2 and φ
R3a
2 = 1− φR3a1 is the maximum value for φR3a2 . Therefore,
LTRR2 > LTRR3a.
The audit frequency in regime 3a is defined as
TAR3a =
αR3a
2
[
1− p+ pφR3a1 + p(1− x1)ηR3a
]
+
βR3a1
2
[
pφR3a2 + p(1−ηR3a)+(1− p)νR3a3
]
.
(85)
The claim that TAR3a > TAR2 follows from αR3a > αR2, βR3a1 > β , x
R2
1 = x
R3a
1 , φ
R2
1 =
φR3a1 and η
R2 = ηR3a. This completes the proof. 
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